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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

ENEMY SUPPLY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA THROUGH 7 JUNE

ARMY review(s) completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia Through 7 June

Introduction

This memorandum is the third in a series of weekly updates of an Intelligence Memorandum on enemy supply losses in Cambodia.* The analysis is based on field reporting of the first 39 days of Allied ground actions in Cambodia. The assessment of supply losses remains tentative until the completion of current operations and the receipt of adjusted data from the field.

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Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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Supply Losses

1. From 30 April through 7 June the enemy lost about 8,500 short tons of food, weapons and equipment, and ammunition in Cambodia as indicated in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons</u>
Class I (food)	6,298
Classes II and IV (weapons and equipment)	253 a/
Class V (ammunition)	1,947
<i>Total</i>	<i>8,498</i>

a. Including 121 tons of clothing, medical supplies, communications and personal equipment, and explosives other than ammunition (last week these supplies totaled 108 tons). Excluding an estimate of 911 tons of vehicles and 19 tons of petroleum. The petroleum figure is down from that given earlier, reflecting a downward revision by the field. These categories were not included in our calculation and have been excluded in this analysis in order to provide comparability of data in making judgments on the drawdown of stockpiles.

The losses include 15,500 individual weapons, 2,200 crew-served weapons, 7.9 million rifle rounds, 3.8 million machinegun rounds, 51,000 mortar rounds, and 1,700 large rocket rounds.

Trends in Supply Losses

2. During the week ending 7 June, 1,123 tons of food, weapons, and ammunition were uncovered by Allied operations, approximately 13% of the total uncovered since operations began on 30 April. This represents a decrease from the daily rate of supply seizures in the previous two weeks -- 198 tons compared with 160 tons, and reflects the downward

trend which has been noted as the operations have continued. Average daily supply losses for representative periods are shown in the following tabulation:

	Short Tons per Day		
	30 Apr-17 May	18-31 May	1-7 Jun
Food	184	153	122
Weapons	4	4	1
Ammunition	62	41	37
<i>Total</i>	<i>250</i>	<i>198</i>	<i>160</i>

3. Geographically, food losses in Base Area 351, the Fishhook (Base Area 352), and the Parrot's Beak (Base Areas 706/367) accounted for nearly all of the enemy's food losses last week. Losses in the Fishhook (Base Area 352) and Base Area 351 alone accounted for about 90% of the supplies captured. New caches of weapons were uncovered in Base Area 351, the Parrot's Beak (Base Areas 706/367), and in Base Areas 704 and 709.* Losses in these base areas represented about 80% of last week's seizure of enemy weapons caches. Communist ammunition losses -- totaling 262 tons -- were concentrated in the Fishhook (Base Area 352) and Base Area 351. These areas accounted for nearly all of the total. No operations were terminated during the past week.

4. Enemy losses in Cambodia compared with our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia are given in the tabulation below:

* As shown in the tabulation above, enemy weapons losses averaged about 1 ton a day, equivalent to about 32 crew-served weapons or 250 individual weapons.

Class of Supply	Short Tons		
	Estimated Enemy Stockpiles in Cambodia Apr 1970	Enemy Losses in Cambodia 30 Apr-7 Jun	Losses as a Percent of Estimated Enemy Stockpiles
Food	6,200 - 10,370	6,298	61 - 102
Weapons and equipment	1,600 - 2,705	253	9 - 16
Ammunition	1,350 - 2,255	1,947	86 - 144
<i>Total</i>	<i>9,150 - 15,330</i>	<i>8,498</i>	<i>55 - 93</i>

a. The range in the estimates reflects the uncertainty about the size of the enemy's strategic stockpiles in Cambodia.

5. The data in the tabulation above indicate that enemy losses have already exceeded the lower limit of our estimates of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia for food -- 102% -- and ammunition -- 144%. This confirms our initial judgment that the true size of enemy stockpiles would be at the upper range of our estimates and could well be greater. Thus the higher figures appear to be the best benchmark from which to measure the significance of the enemy's losses. Looking closely at the mix of ammunition that has been captured suggests that captures of some categories -- large rockets for one -- have been relatively low. Thus it may be that even the upper limit of our estimate of ammunition stockpiles may prove to be low.

6. One possible explanation is that both the upper and lower ranges of our stockpile estimates were based on average daily consumption and ground losses during 1969. If our calculation of stockpiles of enemy ammunition had been based on the higher expenditure rates of 1968 rather than those of 1969, our estimates of ammunition stockpiles would have been from 1,620 to 2,700 tons, or 20% higher than our original estimate. If our estimates had been based on the high Tet-1968 consumption rates, our estimate of the enemy's ammunition stocks would have been from 2,160 tons to 3,600 tons.

Finally, it should be noted that MACV's estimate of Communist ammunition losses is only 1,550 tons compared with our estimate of 1,950 tons.*

7. Weapons losses in Cambodia are equal to about 30% of enemy weapons losses in South Vietnam last year. The loss of these weapons will force the North Vietnamese to make some adjustments in weapons resupply but should not degrade his combat capability in South Vietnam. Relatively few infiltrators have carried arms during infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam during 1968 and 1969. Most were given weapons after arriving in South Vietnam or in base areas along the South Vietnamese - Cambodian border. If the enemy regards weapons losses in Cambodia as serious, we expect to learn of more infiltrators carrying arms in the future.

8. An analysis of Communist weapons losses in Cambodia by type of weapon lost reveals that 54% of the identified weapons are relatively new, manufactured in Communist countries, and of the types currently preferred by enemy forces. Some 29% of the identified weapons are also of Communist manufacture, but are older types no longer in use in most VC/NVA main force units. Most of the weapons manufactured in Western countries -- which comprised 17% of the identified weapons captured -- are older weapons used formerly by the Communists, but which have now been replaced by newer weapons of Soviet and Chinese Communist manufacture in almost all VC/NVA units.**

9. Ammunition losses in South Vietnam by type for 1969 are compared with losses to date in Cambodia in the following tabulation:

* The CIA estimate of ammunition losses is calculated on the basis of an average weight for fairly broad categories of ammunition. MACV's estimates are apparently based on more detailed data than are available in Washington on a day-to-day basis.

** This analysis is based on the types of weapons reported captured. For example, an AK 47 or CKC would be considered a relatively new weapon, whereas the K 44 rifle would be considered an older weapon.

	South Vietnam (1969)	Cambodia	Cambodia/ South Vietnam (Percent)
Small arms	12,403,000	7,883,671	64
Large rockets	4,000	1,707	43
Small rockets	70,000	26,796	38
Mortars	190,000	50,998	27
Grenades	149,000	41,392	28
Recoilless rifles	17,300	22,781	132

Losses of ammunition for recoilless rifles have been exceptionally high and are currently 132% of comparable losses in South Vietnam last year. Other losses of ammunition have ranged between 27% and 64% of the comparable losses in South Vietnam.

10. Some 84% of the identified ammunition captured in Cambodia to date is of Communist manufacture and is compatible with the newer weapons currently used by VC/NVA forces. Of the remaining 16%, 2% is older Communist ammunition and 14% is of Western manufacture.

11. About 360 enemy vehicles had been captured or destroyed as a result of Allied sweeps into Cambodia. Operations Toan Thang 43 and 45 conducted in the Fishhook and Base Area 351 yielded more than 80% of the vehicles taken. Descriptive reporting on the vehicles captured has been negligible, and some 75% of the vehicles taken fall into the "unidentified" category, as shown in the following tabulation:

Type	Number Captured
One-quarter ton trucks	23
One-half ton trucks	11
Three-quarter ton trucks	19
One and one-half ton trucks	3
Two and one-half ton trucks	38
Land Rovers	2
Unidentified	267
<i>Total</i>	<i>363</i>

Resupply Problems

12. There are indications in captured enemy documents and interrogation reports that Allied operations in Cambodia are disrupting Communist resupply efforts in the Mekong Delta area. In Kien Giang Province the Viet Cong have encouraged villagers to prepare rice cakes for North Vietnamese troops fighting in neighboring Cambodia. In addition, a captured enemy document reveals that the Dinh Tuong Province party committee has directed all district and village finance and economy sections to levy and collect immediately the major share of taxes slated for collection later this year. The document states that the urgency results from the recent loss of foodstuffs and other supplies in Cambodia.

13. Interrogation of a Hoi Chanh who rallied to ARVN forces on [] at Fire Support Base Scout (XT 512 940) revealed that his regiment [] (Regiment) is experiencing a rice shortage and that elements of the regiment are on reduced rations. According to the rallier, two battalions of the regiment have the mission of conducting attacks against Allied installations in the Fishhook area.

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Enemy Reactions

14. The second probable Communist sea infiltration attempt since the Allied incursion into Cambodia has been reported. On 29 May a US patrol aircraft detected a suspected Communist trawler on a southeasterly course about 100 miles west of Hainan Island. Probably sensing detection, the trawler reversed its course on 30 May. The two detections in May -- the sixth and seventh observed since September 1969 -- represent an escalation of sea infiltration attempts. Although the exact destination of the detected vessels is unknown, recent Communist supply losses in Cambodia make the Ca Mau Peninsula in IV Corps a likely area.

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Summary

19. US and South Vietnamese forces have captured 8,500 tons of supplies during the first 39 days of operations in Cambodia. About 74% of the enemy losses consist of food, about 23% ammunition, and the remainder weapons and equipment. The rate of supply captures continued to decline this past week -- from an average of 250 tons daily during 30 April to 17 May to 198 short tons per day during 18-31 May and to about 160 tons daily during 1-7 June.

20. Enemy losses have already exceeded the lower limit of our estimates of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia for food -- 102% -- and ammunition -- 144%. This confirms our initial judgment that the true size of the enemy stockpiles would be at the upper range of our estimates and could well be greater.

Cumulative Results of US and ARVN Operations in Cambodia
(as of 7 June 2000 Hours EDT)


Supply Item	Parrot's Beak	Fish- hook	Base Areas					Termi- nated Opera- tions a/	Total
			740	351	350	704/709	704		
Indi- vidual weapons	1,552	4,535	580	2,112	317	2,648	370	3,395	15,509 b/
Crew- served weapons	412	662	132	410	31	140	12	441	2,240 b/
Rice (tons)	864	2,938	411	1,036	68	38 c/	17	926	6,298
Vehicles	25	209	22	91	2	8	0	6	363
Ammuni- tion (tons)	390	327	20	943	25	25	13	204	1,947

a. Terminated operations include Rock Crusher IV, Tia Chop (Base Area 354), Binh Tay I (Base Area 702), Binh Tay II (Base Area 701), and Cuu Long II (Base Area 704).

b. Represents the loss of about 132 tons of arms.

c. Revised downward from 43 tons last week.

VC/NVA Base Areas Along Cambodian Border



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